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will also be addressed . Since there are inconsistencies in
the labellin9 of the 'various types of leaves, it is suggested
here that un1form labels be adopted as described below.

FAMILY AND PARENTAL LEAVE STATUTES:

A STATUS REPORT

by
Rosemarie Feuerbach Twomey*
INTRODUCTION
Con9ress was unable to override President Bush's veto of
legislat1on that would have provided mandated leave, upon
request, to employees of private companies for "famil¥
related" purposes--birth of a child, adoption of a ch1ld, or
to care for sick or disabled family members. However,
nineteen states and the District of Columbia have passed such
legislation. Of that number, nine states and the District of
Columbia have passed laws mandating leave for both parental
and family reasons, and ten states require leave for birth
and/or adoption of a child only (parental leave). Congress
has vowed to revisit the issue at its next opportunity, and it
is highly probable that a federal family leave bill will be
passed into law during the Clinton administration.
A comparison of the states' parental and family leave
statutes reveals wide variations in provisions. This gives
rise to a number of questions. Should the federal government
pass a family or parental leave law to insure uniform
protection to employees and avoid the problems of wide
differences between the laws of one state and the laws of
another? Would a Uniform Family Leave Act accomplish the
major objectives of a federal statute while still allowing
states some discretion to consider the impact of such laws on
their unique business environments? Should emplo¥ers be free
of the requirements of any such legislation and, 1n lieu of
those laws, be encouraged through tax benefits or other
governmental assistance to provide leave to employees for
family related purposes? In light of demographic trends
indicating higher percenta9es of women, minorities, and
disabled persons entering 1nto the workforce [1], employers
might prefer to offer cafeteria style benefits to their
diverse workforces (including, as an option, parental or
family leave) rather than be required by law to grant one type
of benefit at the risk of having to forego others [2].
The primary focus of this paper is on parental and/or
family leave laws, although maternity and pregnancy leave laws
* Assistant Professor, College of Business Administration,
Fairleigh Dickinson University

The passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
as amended by the
Disability Act led many states to
enact statutes requi 1ng that leave be granted to an employee
who 9ives birth. Su
leave may or may not include a period
of t1me for the care f the newborn as distinguished from time
to heal and recuperate from the act of giving birth. These
leaves are usually called "maternity" or "pregnane¥" leaves,
but are sometimes referred to as "medical," "disab1lity,"
"parental," "child care," or "family" leaves.
It is recommended here that those labels be refined and
used as follows: "Maternity" and "pregnancy" leave should
refer to leave for a female emplo¥ee in relation to the birth
of that employee's child. To be 1n compliance with federal
law, such leave should be equal to or greater than, but not
less than, leave made available to employees for other
temporar¥ disabilities [3]. "Parental" leave should refer to
leave wh1ch is granted to care for a newborn or newly adopted
child. The EEOC uses the term "parental leave" to refer to
leave which is taken "to care for a child of any age, or to
develop a healthy parent-child relationship, or to help a
family adjust to the presence of a newborn or adopted child"
(4). "Family" leave should refer to leave for the purpose of
caring for a sick or disabled --family member, or for some other
family-related reason. "Medical" and "disability" leave
should refer to leave for the employee who cannot work due to
his or her own temporary disability or illness.
The states' parental and family leave statutes ride a
continuum from minimum to maximum concern for employer needs .
The statutory provisions of the several family/parental leave
laws are presented below with comments indicating which are
the most and the least favorable to employers. Also addressed
is whether the provisions of the laws pose any significant
legal problems; and, where appropriate, comparisons are made
with the federal bill which was vetoed b¥ President Bush. The
paper concludes with a discussion compar1ng the advantages and
disadvantages of enacting federal law on the subject,
formulating a Uniform Parental/Famil¥ Leave Act, leaving the
matter completely to the states' leg1slators, or, conversely,
discouraging passage of more legislation in this area at
either the state or federal level.
The twenty statutes which provide for mandated parental
andfor family leave for private sector
have been
divided into two categories: Section I l1sts and describes
those which
for both parental and famil¥ leave, and
Section II 11sts and describes those which requ1re leave only
for birth and/or adoption of a child (including maternity and
pregnancy leave laws). Section III describes statutor¥
provisions in four states' laws which provide alternat1ve
means of addressing family concerns in employment.
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For purposes of this pap7r, only statutes
to
private sector employers are 1ncluded. Laws wh1ch perta1n
only to public sector employers are not covered.
I.

COMPREHENSIVE STATUTES MANDATING BOTH PARENTAL AND
FAMILY LEAVE.

Nine states and the District of Columbia require both
parental and famil¥ leave. Those states are California,
Connecticut, Hawai1, Maine, New Jerse¥, Oregon, Rhode Island,
washin9ton, and Wisconsin. In analyz1ng.these laws, the
follow1ng items were selected for compar1son:

A.
B.

c.
D.

E.
F.

G.

H.

I.

J.

Provisions as to who is a "child" whose birth or
adoption triggers the right to mandated leave.
The circumstances under which family leave is to
be granted.
.
Provisions indicating what constitutes an 1llness
for purposes of family leave.
.
The number of employees needed to br1ng an
employer within the coverage of the law.
Employee's rights and remedies under the act.
The employee's right to reinstatement.
The employer's right to require notice and/or
certification to confirm the need for the leave.
Length of the mandated leave period.
The employer's right to deny or limit leave.
Effects of leave on employee benefits.
A. Provisions as to who is a "child" whose birth
or adopt1on tr1ggers the r1ght to mandated leave.

All the statutes in Section I require employers to grant
"parental" leave for both birth and adoption of a child.
Leave granted for birth of a child always
to a natural
or biological child. With re9ard to adopt1on, the
differ. California's (5) def1nition for purposes of
includes a requ1rement of dependency status. connect1cut s
(6) definition of child is limited
1s under the.age
of 18 or who is a dependent due to 1nab1l1ty to care for h1m
or herself. New Jersey (7J and Wisconsin [8) ar7
to
Connecticut in the1r def1n1tion of ch1ld. The D1str1ct of
Columbia's [9J statute mandates leave for an employee w1th
whom a ch1ld 1s placed--even when such placement is not for
purposes of adoption, i.e:, as long as the employee . . . .
permanently assumes and d1schar9es parental respons1b1l1t1es
for such a child. As such, it 1s the only statute which does
not require a legal relationship to
who is a.child
for either a leave granted when such ch1ld 1s placed w1th the
employee or leave granted to care for such a child up?n his or
her illness. Maine (10], Rhode Island [11], and Wash1ntton
[12] limit the-aerin1tion of ch1ld for purposes of adop 10n by
age: for Maine and Rhode Island the child must be 16 years of

age or less, and for Washington, 5 years of age or less.
Hawaii (13] neither broadens nor limits its definition of
ch1ld for adoption purposes.
Oregon (14] provides for both parental and family leave
in two separate statutes--one which makes it an unlawful
employment practice to refuse to grant an employee's request
for a parental leave of absence and one which
for
Family Medical Leave.
Although Oregon is unl1ke the above
states which provide the parental and family leave benefits in
one comprehensive statute, it is included in Section I. Under
Oregon's law a child, for purposes of requesting leave for
adoption, is one who is under 6 years of age.
Least Favorable to
The District of Columbia's
statute g1ves broadest pro ec 1on to employees by requ1r1ng
leave for the placement of any child with an employee,
regardless of the existence of a legal relationship with such
a child, as long as the employee "assumes and discharges"
parental responsibility for such a child.
The federal bill's definition describes a "son or
daughter" as a 11 b1olog1cal, adopted, or foster child, a
stepchild, a legal ward, or a child of a
standing in
loco parentis ..• " [15]. This definition 1s similar in scope
to D.C.'s statute, and would preempt the state laws which have
narrower definitions.
Most Favorable to Em5loaers: Rhode Island and Maine, by
omitt1ng def1n1t1ons of c 1l , could be narrowly construed,
and thereby benefit employers. Washington and Oregon limit
the definition of child in the case of adoption to children 5
years of age or less, the most restrictive of the statutes
which limit the definitiQn of child for adoption purposes.
B.

The circumstances under which leave is to be granted.

Family leave, which refers to leave 9ranted in order to
enable an employee to care for a sick fam1ly member, is
mandated in all the statutes included in Section I. However,
the definitions of family member, child, spouse, and parent
differ; the criteria which constitute an illness which
entitles an employee to such leave varies; and the states are
not in agreement as to whether family leave (with its
guarantees of reinstatement and other benefits) includes the
right of an employee to take leave for his or her own
illness. The questions of when family leave is to be granted
and who is considered a family member are addressed first.
Connecticut [16], Maine [17], Rhode Island [18], and
Wiscons1n [19] provide fam1ly leave for the employee's own
1llness, a logical extension of the concerns expressed in the
objectives of family leave laws.
The federal bill includes a provision for leave to an
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employee whose serious health condition makes the employee
unable to perform the functions of his or her position (20].
All the statutes, except Washington, indicate that an
employee is entitled to family leave to care for a serious
health condition or serious illness of a child, spouse, or
parent of the employee. Under Washington's law (21) employers
must grant leave to employees to take care of a newborn or a
newly adopted child under the age of 6 or a child under the
age of 18 with a terminal health condition. There is no
provision for leave to care for a spouse or parent.
Interestingly, the law does provide that an employee's accrued
sick leave can be used to care for a child under 18 who simply
requires "treatment" or "supervision"--no other statute
addresses leave to care for a child who is neither seriously
nor terminally ill, but only mildly ill.
The District of Columbia (22] has passed the only statute
which includes 1n 1ts def1nition of family member a child who
lives with the employee and for whom the
permanently
assumes and discharges parental responsibil1ty and a person
with whom the employee shares or has shared, within the past
year, a mutual residence and with whom the employee maintains
a committed relationship.
Least Favorable to Emploters: The District of Columbia
has the broadest def1n1t1on o family member. It 1s the only
one which includes .a . person with whom the employee shares
or has shared a mutual residence and with whom the employee
maintains a committed relationship. In addition, it includes
as a child one who lives with the employee and for whom the
employee permanently assumes and discharges parental
resonsibility. This could include one who is the child of a
live-in companion, whether or not a legal or blood
relationship exists.
Most Favorable to Employers: Washinlton does not require
that leave be granted for the 1llness of am1ly members other
than the child of the employee.
c.

Provisions indicating what constitutes an illness
for purposes of fam1ly leave.

California (23], Connecticut (241, the District of
Columb1a (25], New Jerset (261, and W1sconsin (27] have
substantially s1m1lar de init1ons for ser1ous health condition
or serious illness: an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves either inpatient
care in a hospital or other health care facility, or
continuing treatment or supervision by a health care
provider. Wisconsin and Connecticut add the adjective
"disabling" to the definition, a word that was found to be
ambiguous in a Wisconsin case since it could mean any illness
or injury that interferes with
of daily functions,
not necessarily one that is lim1ted to long-term illnesses or

conditions. In the same case, it was decided that the
employee who took one day off for bronchitis was not entitled
to protection from discharge under this law because the
illness did not call for outpatient care with "continuing
treatment" by a health care provider (28].
The Rhode Island (29] statute defines a seriously ill
person as one who b¥ reason of an accident, disease, or
condition is in imm1nent danger of death, or requires
hospitalization involving an organ transplant, limb amputation
or other procedure of similar severity. Maine's (30]
definition is the same, except that it adds a third
possibility: a mental or physical condition that requires
constant in-home care. The Washington (31] statute, which
limits family leave to care for an 111 child only, is further
limited to a child with a "terminal health condition" one
which is caused by injury, disease, or illness, that is
incurable and will produce death within the period of the .
leave. This very restrictive definition is softened somewhat
by the state's law which requires employers to allow employees
to use accrued sick leave to care for a child who requires
treatment or supervision due to a "health condition." Hawaii
(32) defines a serious health condition as "an acute,
traumatic or life threatening illness, injury, or impairment
that requires a physician's treatment or supervision."
Oregon (33) defines serious health condition in more
severe terms, such as a condition which poses an "imminent
danger of death, is terminal in prognosis with a reasonable
possibility of death in the near future," but also includes in
the definition the more general "illness of a child of an
employee requiring home care" and "any mental or physical
condition that requires constant care."
Least Favorable to Emplo¥ers: California, Connecticut,
D.C., New Jersey, and W1scons1n entitle emplorees to broad
protect1on w1th regard to reasons for request1ng family
leave. However, the California law states that the condition
must be one which "warrants the participation of a family
member to provide the care." An employer could require
evidence that the
personal presence is necessary to
care for the ill fam1ly member.
Most Favorable to Employers: Hawaii and Rhode Island
allow employees a r1ght to fam1ly leave only in very
restricted circumstances involving a terminal prognosis for
the ill family member.
D.

The number of emtloyees needed to bring the employer
w1th1n he coverage of the law.

The following list shows the number of employees an
employer must have in order to be considered an "employer"
under the law. They are in order, from the lowest number of
employees to the highest. Some of the statutes staggered the
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effectiveness of their laws, making the law applicable to
employers with a higher number of employees in the first year,
and reducing the number in later years (District of Columbia,
New Jersey, and Connecticut). The numbers below represent the
lowest final numbers provided in the various states' laws.
District of Columbia (34) - 20 or more.
Ma1ne [35] - 25 or more.
(36)- 25 or more (for its parental leave law).
50 or more (for its family leave law).
California (37) - 50 or more.
New Jersey (38) - 50 or more.
Rhode Island (39) - 50 or more.
W1scons1n (40) - 50 or more.
Connect1cut [41) - 75 or more.
Rawa11 [42] - 100 or more.
Wash1ngton (43) - 100 or more.
Least Favorable to EmploSers: The District of Columbia's
statute appl1es to a broaderase of employers (those w1th 20
or more employees) than any of the other states' laws. Also
broad is Maine (25 or more employees).
Most Favorable to EmaloSers: Hawaii and washington are
the only ones wh1ch exclu eus1nesses w1th less than Ioo
employees from the law's requirements, indicating a concern
about the impact of the law on small businesses.
The federal bill covers employers of 50 or more (44).
E.

Employees' rights and remedies under the act.

The extent to which there is statutory language which
grants the benefactors of the laws (the employees) specific
remedies with which to enforce the rights established in the
laws is an indication of the seriousness of purpose which the
legislators brought to their deliberations of these parental
and family leave statutes. The statutory provisions range
from no mention of remedies (in which case it is presumed the
employee can take civil action in a court of general
jurisdiction) to several clauses allowing for civil penalties,
punitive damages, and other relief.
The New Jersef law (45) attempts to balance the interests
of business aga1ns the state's acknowledged policy of
protecting and promoting the stability and economic security
of family units. It provides that, in addition to other
relief or affirmative action permitted, a penalty of not more
than $2000 for a first offense, and not more than $5000 for
second and subsequent offenses will be assessed against
violators. Also, punitive damages of up to $10,000 for an
individual and $500,000 for a class action (or 1% of the net
worth of the employer, whichever is less) can be awarded to
plaintiffs, as well as reasonable attorney's fees to the
prevailing party. If the employer prevails, however, bad

faith must be shown in order recover attorney's fees.
Other states which provide penalties against violators
are Rhode Island (46), Washinfiton (47], and Maine (48). Rhode
Island w1ll assess not more t an $1000 for eacn-day of a
continuing violation; Washington will fine up to $200 for a
first infraction and $1000 for each additional; and Maine
provides liquidated damages of $100 per day for each day a
violation continues.
The District of Columbia (49J, Hawaii (50], Wisconsin
(51], and Wash1ngton employ admin1strat1ve processes for
parties seeking relief under these laws. Washington alone
precludes the right of an employee to take civil action, but
allows awards of reinstatement and backpay. Wisconsin
requires filing with its agency within 30 days of the
violation, and an attempt at conciliation will be made before
a hearing will be given. After exhausting the
administrative process, an employee may take civil action. In
the District of Columbia a successful plaintiff may be awarded
backpay plus interest, and up to three times that amount in
consequential damages, medical expenses not covered by health
insurance, and costs and reasonable attorney's fees. If the
agenc¥ process goes beyond 150 days, the aggrieved employee
may f1le a civil action.
,
Least Favorable to Employers: New Jersey specifically
provides that an employee may seek pun1t1ve damages up to
$10,000 for an individual. New Jersey also assesses the
highest penalty on employers for violations--$2,000 for the
first offense and up to $5,000 for each subsequent offense.
The federal bill contains a provision unlike any of the
state statutes.
standing to any one or more
employees for and in behalf of other employees to take action
in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction
against any employer, including a public agency (52).
Most Favorable to Employers: Washinaton precludes a
private r1ght of act1on for emplo¥ees, an assesses only a
$200 fine for the first emplo¥er 1nfraction, and up to $1,000
for each infraction if violat1ons continue. A successful
employee may be limited to reinstatement and backpay.
F.

Employee's right to reinstatement.

California
Connecticut (54], Rhode Island (55], and
Wiscons1n [56] s1mply mandate re1nstatement of the employee to
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his or her former position, or to a position with equivalent
duties, pay, benefits, and other terms and conditions of
employment. The remaining states, while acknowledging
substantially the same right of reinstatement, qualify the
right by recognizing exceptions which operate in favor of
employers. Hawaii (57] and New Jersey (58) state that
reinstatement can be denied rr-the employer experiences
layoffs or workforce reductions and the employee would have
lost the position if not on leave pursuant to a bona fide
layoff and recall system.
The District of Columbia (591 allows an
to deny
reinstatement to an employee who 1s among the h1ghest paid 10%
of the employer's workforce if the employer can demonstrate
that reinstatement would result in substantial economic injury
to its operations. Oregon (601 and Washington [61] have
similar language stat1ng that 1f the employer's circumstances
have so changed that the employee cannot be reinstated to the
former or equivalent job, the employee shall be reinstated to
any other position that is available and suitable.
Washington's statute goes on to state that the entitlement to
reinstatement does not apply if the
has been
eliminated by a bona fide restructur1ng or reduction-in-force,
the workplace has been moved to at least 60 miles away or is
permanently or temporarily shut down for at least 30 days, or
if the employee takes another job, or does not provide timely
notice of his or her intent to take family leave, or did not
return on the agreed-on-day.
The broadest right to deny reinstatement is found in
Maine's (62] law which states that reinstatement can be denied
1f the employer proves that the employee was not restored
because of conditions unrelated to the employee's exercise of
rights under this act.
Least Favorable to Employers: The statutes which are
silent as to the r1ght of an employer to deny reinstatement
could prove most beneficial to employees. These include
California, connecticut, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin.
Most Favorable to Employers: Those statutes which
specif1cally recogn1ze the employer's right to deny
reinstatement in particular circumstances are desirable for
employers. In particular, Maine's catch-all exception
provides a major loophole operat1ng in favor of employers.
The federal bill contains an exemption for certain highly
compensated employees--the highest paid 10 percent of the
employees employed by the emplorer within 75 miles of the
facility at which the employee 1s employed--which allows the
employer to deny restoration to such
if it is
necessary to prevent substantial and gr1evous economic injury
to the operations of the employer (63].

All of the statutes require notice of the intent to take
a leave unless the reasons for taking the leave are
Connecticut (64]
2 weeks' notice;
Ma1ne (65] and Rhode Island (66) re9u1re 30 days' notice; and
tneothers requ1re "reasonable" not1ce. Washington [67] is
the only state which requires written not1ce (3 days for
leave and 14 days for family leave) . All except
Ma1ne and Rhode Island state that employees should make
efforts in
leave dates to avoid
d1srupt1ng the employer's bus1ness operations.
All the statutes except Rhode Island specifically permit
employers . to require
from a physician or health
care prov1der, and Connect1cut alone requires that the
empl?yee provide a written . certificate from a physician
stat1ng the nature of the 1llness and its probable duration.
New Jerset (68], Washington, and Wisconsin (69] permit the
employero obtain a second medical op1n1on at the employer's
New Jersey and Washington adding that if there
1s a confl1ct between the two opinions, a third opinion may be
sought--in New Jersey such party is chosen jointly. In
the third is chosen by the other health care
prov1ders.
Oregon (70) and ,Washington laws provide that if the
employee fails to provide notice as required the employer may
reduce the leave period by 3 weeks.
'
Least Favorable to
By reason of its limited
employee not1ce requ1remen s and its silence regarding the
employer's right to require verification from a physician,
Rhode Island shows less concern for employers.
. Most Favorable to
Washington has a 30-day
wr1tten not1ce requ1remen , a concern for d1srupting the
business operations of the employer, an allowance for an
employer's demand for confirmation from a health care
provider, plus the right of the emplorer to punish an employee
who fails to abide by the notice requ1rements.
H.

Length of mandated leave period.

The length of the mandated leave periods fall between 2
weeks in a 1-year period to 16 weeks in a 2-year period. In
order from the shortest to the longest, they are:
Wisconsin [71]

-

2 weeks in a 1-year period for family
leave.
6 weeks in a 1-year period for
parental leave.
8 weeks in a 1-year period for a
combination of leaves.
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Hawaii [72] - 4 weeks in a 1-year period.
Maine [73]

- 10

weeks in a 2-year period.

New Jersey [74]

- 12

Washington [75]

-

Oregon [76]

-

weeks in a 2-year period.

12 weeks in a 2-year period.

12 weeks in a 2-year period for family
leave.
12 weeks in a restricted period of time
for parental leave.*

Rhode Island [77] - 13 weeks in a 2-year period.
Connecticut [78] - 16 weeks in a 2-year period.
District of Columbia [79] - 16 weeks in a 2-year
period.
California [80] - 4 months in a 2-year period.
* Oregon's statute requires an employee to take the
parental leave between the birth of the infant and the time
the infant reaches 12 weeks of age. If the child was born
prematurely, the 12-week period will be extended to the time
the child will have reached the developmental stage equavalent
to 12 weeks of age. For adoptions·, the leave must be within
the 12-week period which begins when the employee takes
physical custody of the child.
The federal bill provides a total of 12 workweeks of
leave during any 12-month period [81].
Least Favorable to
California, Connecticut,
and the D1str1ct of Columbia permit the longest leave per1ods
for employees.
Most Favorable to Emtloyers: Wisconsin provides only 2
weeks 1n a 1-year per1odor family leave, by far the shortest
leave period of all the statutes.
I.

Employer's right to deny leave.

The statutes of California [82], Connecticut [83], the
District of Columbia [84], New Jersey [85], Ore£on [86], and
Wash1ngton [87] specificall¥ recogn1ze the r1gh of employers
to den¥ parental and/or fam1ly leave to employees in certain
situat1ons. The California, Connecticut, Oregon, and
Washington laws allow employers to restrict the combined leave
of a husband and wife to the maximum leave period provided for
one employee (in some states, even though they may work for
different employers).
In California, if an employee's spouse
is unemployed, the employee cannot take a leave. Likewise, in
Oregon leave can be denied to an employee if another family

member

to be a caregiver. In oregon, washington,
the
can deny leave to a husband and
w1fe s1multaneously (1n some states, whether or not they work
for the same employer).
Employers in California, the District of Columbia New
Jersey, and Washington can deny leave to high paid employees
when necessary to avoid substantial economic
to the
employer's operations. In California and the D1strict of
include an employee who is one of the 5
h1ghest.pa1d or 1s among the top 10% in 9ross salary.
In New
1t
an employee who is salar1ed and among the
h19hest
5% or one of the 7 highest paid employees 1
wh1chever 1s greater. In Washington it includes
to 10% of
the
who are designated (in writing and d1splayed in
a consp1cuous place) as "key personnel," or the highest paid
10% of the employees.
New Jersey has inserted a punitive clause in its
statute stating that no employee shall,
dur1ng the leave per1od, perform services on a full-time basis
for
whom.the emplo¥ee did not provide those
serv1ces 1mmed1ately pr1or to tak1ng leave. However no
sanctions are given for violators.
'
Least Favorable to Employers: Hawaii Maine Rhode
Island, and W1scons1n have no provis1ons
9ranting
the r1ght to
parental and family leave 1n given
c1rcumstances or to certa1n classes of employees.
,Most Favorable to Emploters: California, New Jersey, and
Wash1ngton recogn1ze at leas two types of s1tuat1ons 1n which
can den¥
or family leave to employees.
Cal1forn1a has as open-ended provision which
would perm1t an employer to deny leave if it would result in
undue hardship to the employer's operations.
J.

Effects of leave on employee benefits.

Preservation of rights and benefits which have accrued up
to the
of a leave period is standard for all the
parental/fam1ly leave statutes. The laws differ in regard to
whether or
they
9ontinuation of benefits during
the leave per1od. The D1str1ct of Columbia [88], New Jerset
[89], Rhode Island [90], and W1scons1n [91J statutes 1nd1ca e
employers shall continue certa1n benef1ts for employees
wh1le on leave.
law specifically states that the employer
shall ma1nta1n.coverage under a group health insurance policy,
a group subscr1ber contract, or a health care plan at the
and.under the conditions coverage would have been
prov1ded 1f the employee had continued to work. The law was
challenged and was found to be pre-empted by the Employee
Income Security Act with regard to any plans
wh1ch would come within the jurisdiction of the federal
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law (92). The legal issue of pre-empti?n
apply t? .
several other of the state's statutes w1th s1m1lar prov1s1ons.
For the protection of employers, some states have a
provision that employees pa¥ to the emplo¥er a
of.money
equal to the amount of the 1nsurance prem1ums wh1ch w1ll
paid during the time of the leave. Rhode Island makes th1s
payment a statutory requirement, adding that the employer
shall return such payment to the employee
days.
following the employee's return to work. W1scons1n perm1ts
employers to require an escrow payment for this purpose.
California (93], Washington (94], and Oregon (95) have
provis1ons wh1ch specif1cally absolve employers from
requirements of continuing benefits during leave.
California
allows employers to refuse to make pension or retirement
contributions during the leave. Washington's law states,
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to require the
employer to grant benefits, including seniority or pension
rights during any period of leave." Both states acknowledge
the employees' rights to continue group health insurance plans
at the employee's expense. Finally, under Oregon's law
benefits are not required to accrue during the leave.
Maine's [96) law requires that employers make it possible
for employees to continue benefits at the employee's expense.
Least Favorable to Emtloyers: Statutes which mandate
continued benef1ts dur1nghe leave period include those of
the District of Columbia, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Wiscons1n.
Most Favorable to
Rhode Island indicates a
concern for the employers protection by requ1ring employees
to make a prior payment to employers for the cost of .
continuing benefits for the duration of the leave per1od.
California, Washington, and Oregon allow employers to refuse
to cont1nue certa1n benefits dur1ng that period.
II.

STATES MANDATING LEAVE FOR PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH,
ADOPTION OR CARE OF A NEWBORN OR NEWLY ADOPTED CHILD
ONLY.
(These statutes contain no provisions for care
of an ill family member.)

The following statutory provisions reflect a deliberate
effort to abide by civil rights re9uirements concerning sex
and pregnancy discrimination. It
somewhat ironic that in
an attempt to comply with those laws, several states have
enacted laws which appear to violate those very laws. Part of
the problem stems from the fact that it is legally necessary
to treat pregnancy and childbirth the same as other temporary
disabilities are treated, and that treating pregnancy more
favorably than other temporary disabilities met with approval
by the u.s. Supreme Court (97]. Since pregnancy and
childbirth are biologically associated only with the female

gender, many of the statutes grant benefits such as leave only
to female employees. As long as the benefits are tied to the
related medical condition of pregnancy and childbirth there
is no legal problem with grantin9 them only to
However, as stated earlier, by
child care leave with
pregnancy and childbirth leave, and 9ranting the benefit only
t? females, there can be a sex
violation of
VII as well as a potential constitutional question of
equal protection (98).
The followin9 statutes are presented in alphabetical
order with code
accompaniments for reference. Many are
part of comprehensive fair employment practice or civil rights
statutes. Key words have been highlighted to enable the
reader to scan the significant facts.
Iowa:

Iowa Civil
Act
eregnant
be g1ven leave for the1r per1od of d1sability or for
8 wee s, whichever is less (99).
Kansas: The state's law against discrimination has been
interpreted to require employers to grant a reasonable
of leave to female emplolees for childbearing and to re1nstate
her to her or1g1nal (or 1ke) pos1t1on after leave [100).
Kentucky: The Fair Employment Practices law requires an
employer to grant a reasonable leave up to six 6 weeks to care
adopted child under the age of 7 (101).
Louisiana: Under a pregnancy discrimination law an
employer 1s required to grant a reasonable leave up
4
disability for pregnancy or a related medical
cond1t1on (102].
--Massachusetts: Maternity leave shall be granted to a
female employee for birth or the adoption of a child under the
a9e of 18, or 1f-cfie-chiTd-rs-pliys1ca11y or mentally
d1sabled, under the a9e of 23. The emplo¥ee shall be restored
to her original posit1on or a similar pos1tion with the same
status, pay, length of service credit and seniority. However
this does not apply if there is a layoff [103).
'
Note: Massachusetts' law is likely to be in violation of
the federal C1v1l R1ghts Act, Title VII. The EEOC recently
that leaves
t? females only, which are not
to pregnane¥,
or related medical
cond1t1ons, may be 1n v1olat1on of the sex discrimination
prohibitions of the law (104]. Clearly, a leave granted to a
woman for the purpose of adoption does not involve a medical
condition and is only for child care.
It therefore should
also be made available to male employees in order to be in
compliance with federal law.
Minnesota: Leave shall be granted to an employee who is
a natural or
parent in conjunction with the birth or
adoption of a ch1ld. The leave may begin not more
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weeks after the birth or adoption (105).
The act covers employers with 21 or more employees at at
least one site [106].
The length of the leave period
weeks [107].
In addition to remedies otherwise prov1ded by law, a
person may bring a civil action to recover any and all damages
recoverable at law, together with cost and
including reasonable attorney's fees, as well as 1n)unct1ve
and other equitable relief at court's discretion (108).
The employee shall be entitled to return to his or her
former position or a position of comparable duties, number of
hours and pay. However, if the emplo¥er experiences a layoff
and the employee would have lost a pos1tion pursuant to a bona
fide layoff and recall system, the employee is not entitled to
reinstatement, but retains all other rights under the system
as if the employee had not taken the leave [109].
The leave shall begin at a time requested b¥ the
employee. The employer may adopt reasonable pol1cies
governing the timing of requests for unpaid leave (110].
The employer shall continue to make coverage available to
the employee, wh11e-on-1eave, under group 1nsurance, group
subscriber contract, or health care plan for the employee and
dependents. Nothing in this act requires the employer to pay
the costs [111].
Montana: Under the state's Fair Employment Practices
law, an employer must grant a reasonable leave for
pregnancy/maternity, the length to be
on a
case-by-case bas1s. The employee must be re1nstated to her
original or equivalent position [112].
New Hampshire: Under the state's law against
discr1m1nat1on, leave is to be
for temporary
disability due to pregnancy ch1ldbirth or a related medical
condition and to re1nstate the employer to the same or a
comparable position unless business necessity makes it
impossible or unreasonable (113).
Tennessee: An employer must grant a full-time female
employee up to 4 months leave for pregnancyh childbirth, and
nurs1ng of her Infant and reinstate her to er
or
s1m1lar position unless the position is so unique 1t cannot be
temporarily filled after reasonable efforts have been made or
if the employee has used the leave to pursue other employment
or has worked full-time for another employer during the
leave. The act specifically excludes male employees from
taking "maternity leave" (114].
Vermont: Under the state's pregnancy leave law, an
employer must grant
to 1 *ear to a female employee during
pregnane! and follow1nA-oirt and reinstate her to the same or
comparab e pos1t1on.
n employee may seek relief for
violation of the act in a private civil suit (115).
Commentart: Because providing leave for childcare to
females and no to males has been ruled as sex discrimination

law [116], states which run the risk of being
1nclude: Kentucky and Massachusetts (both of
wh1ch mandate leave for female employees for adoption) and
Vermont (which mandates leave for female employees for'up to a
per1od of 1 year (unless it is clearly granted only when a
related medical condition is involved).
III.

ALTERNATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ADDRESSING FAMILY
CONCERNS IN EMPLOYMENT.

,
The following statutory provisions are included to
1llustrate that other possibilities exist for addressing the
need
concerns in the context of employment.
Creat1ve
should be encouraged to propose statutory
schemes wh1ch may better address the needs of employees with
family obligations than the ones already enacted.
, . California: Up to 4
per year must be granted for
v1s1ts b¥ an
to h1s or her child's school. Employers
may requ1re a s1gned document verifying the visit [117].
Connecticut: In conjunction with its family and parental
the
of Labor shall report on the
feas1b1l1ty of establ1sh1ng a statewide job bank of
employees available to work for temporary periods
of t1me (118].
The Oregon family leave law is not applicable if
offers to.the employee a nondiscriminatory
as def1ned by the IRS Code, providing as one
of 1ts opt1ons a parental leave benefit that is at least
equivalent to the benefit required by this act (119).
the

Oregon:

,
Nevada: It is a misdemeanor to terminate an employee who
1s a parent, guardian or custodian of a child and who (1)
appears at a conference requested by an administrator of a
school or (2) is notified during work of an emergency
the child by a school
(120]. In addition,
1t 1s an unlawful employment pract1ce to fail or refuse to
leave to a pregnant female
if such a benefit is
prov1ded to employees for other med1cal reasons [121].
COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing statutes, with their varied and sometimes
conflicting definitions, remedies, and even major provisions
P?Se a challenge for
interstate employers who must
w1th the numerous requ1rements relating to their
employer-employee relationships. One solution would be for
Congress to successfully pass a family/parental leave bill.
Proponents of a national policy on parental leave are
ab?ut balancing the needs of America's
ch1ldren aga1nst the other demands made on their work1ng
parents--demands which lead to the need for two-income
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families and working mothers (122]. Others recognize a
for a policy to help employees who choose to
for ag1ng
parents at a time when costs of health and nurs1ng care are
rapidly increasing and people are living longer.
There is reason to believe that a federal law which would
provide minimum benefits andfor leave to employees.would be
acceptable to employers. Many large corporate bus1nesses
already make parental/family leave available to their workers
and, as women become a larger
the workforce,.
management will respond to the1r needs 1n order to reta1n
them. A recent study of 700 firms conducted by the National
Chamber Foundation of the U. s. Chamber of Commerce revealed
that 77 percent of the firms implemented policies that
addressed the parental leave needs of workers (123). The
benefits to employers of making family/parental
available to the workforce include greater product1v1ty,
better quality of job performance, and reductions in
absenteeism, tardiness, turnover, and stress.
A federal law would establish uniform regulations to ease
the burden on interstate employers. However, although the
federal bill contains a preemption provision, it makes clear
that states which pass leave laws more favorable to employees
shall not be superseded by the federal law. The problem of
conflicting statutory requirements would therefore still
exist. A Uniform Family/Parental Leave Act may better address
this problem. Those
wanting to
s?me
of
job securit¥ for workers 1n the face of 1ncreas1ng fam1ly
responsibil1ties and rising health costs, could turn to the
Uniform Act and select from alternative provisions those which
best fit their needs. Although the states may choose
different options, there would be a standardization of
definitions, remedies, and language which would make both
compliance and enforcement more effective.
Although small businesses have voiced opposition to a
federal mandatory leave law on the basis of cost, the fact
that all the states' leave laws as well as the proposed
federal bill require only unpaid leave, leads
to
believe that the c?st burden 1s
A
argument
of small business 1s that when a bus1ness 1s requ1red by law
to offer one type of benefit for its workforce, the effect is
to make it more costly to offer varied benefit packages for
workers with different needs. It has been suggested that a
better alternative to mandated leave is to provide tax credits
to employers who provide such leave (124].
The United States has been compared unfavorably to other
western industrialized nations regarding its national and
state policies on emplo¥IDent security issues, in 9eneral,
parental leave, in part1cular. Most of those nat1ons prov1de
medical care or health insurance for pregnane¥, and have
maternity leave benefits which include a spec1fied leave
before and after childbirth, in addition to replacement of all
or some of the wages lost during the leave and a guarantee of

job reinstatement (125]. Although in those countries the
burden is
by the taxpayers
than by employers,
mandated unpa1d leave may not be too h19h a price to pay to
the economic and social wellbe1ng of the American
of
laws regard them as reasonable
m1n1mum requ1rements wh1ch would secure the jobs of employees
whose family responsibilities might otherwise lead to loss of
employment, compounding already stressful situations.
In conclusion, the objectives of parental and family
leave laws can be met through either a federal statute or
through the continued enactment of statutes in the individual
The
situation can be problematic for large
bus1nesses since the statutes present an arra¥ of
requ1rements whi?h makes
difficult for such organizat1ons
to compl¥· A Un1form Fam1ly/Parenta1 Leave Act is a possible
alternat1ve solution to that problem.
Beyond the statutory schemes presented above are other
alternatives which could be explored by employers such as
child care, flexible work schedules for
parents, home
and job sharing arrangements.
Leg1slators could cons1der other creative solutions to the
problem, such as tax credits to parents for childcare
tax.benefits to employers to encourage policies
a1med at help1ng
who are burdened with family
Wh1ch affect their employment, or laws
s1m1lar to Nevada's and California's which require employers
to be
in regard to employees who must attend to the
educat1onal needs of their children by meeting with school
personnel during working hours.
The challenge for legislators at both the national and
state level is to fashion laws which can satisfactorily meet
the
of both employees and employers and at the same time
accompl1sh the larger, societal objectives of a
workforce without compromising the employees' ab1lity to meet
family obligations outside of the workplace.
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Introduction

Npw that the
eighties are gone and Michael
Mil ken and Ivan Boesky and other high profile securities
traders have served tlme in jail, the relative calm in Wall
Street "wheeling and dealing" presents a wonderful
for Congress to finally clarify insider trading law.
Al thougp the newspapers have been full of insider trading
stories and numbers of highly publifized insider trading
cases have come before the courts,
Congress has never
clarified what insider trading is and what specific behavior
should be prohibited.
Leaving these "details" to the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts has
resulted in wrangling between the former and the latter and in
a body of law that does not make much sense.
·This article will first discuss the Congressional purpose
and methods for prohibiting insider trading. Then, SEC Rules
lOb-5 and 14e-3 will be explained and compared.
The
comparison will show that the statutes authorizing the SEC to
promulgate those rules are not identical and, therefore, the
letter of the law does not require those rules to be
interpreted identically.
Nevertheless, there is no policy
reason to have rules prohibiting insider trading vary
depending on whether or not the securities being traded are
the subject of a tender offer.
Therefore, this article
concludes that Congress, in order to create coherent insider
trading law, should explicitly indicate which of the two rules
has been properly interpreted by the courts. Application of
the rules is difficult enough without having the additional
burden of incongruous policy.
II.

Prohibiting Insider Trading

Congress has made clear its intention to stop insider
trading as well as other market practices it considers abusive
in order to maintain
confidence in the fairness of the
securities
markets.
The
stock
market
crash
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